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Abstract
　Republicanism has been divided into two strands, neo-Athenian and neo-
Roman. This division, unlike others, is made in its historical origin. These 
strands are distinctive in their own conceptions of liberty: neo-Athenians 
view liberty as self-government while neo-Romans it as non-domination. 
Accordingly they have different views of the relationship between liberty 
and the rule of law: neo-Athenians see it as circular while neo-Romans as 
constitutive. Their views give us new perspectives and make us conscious of 
their defects as well; neo-Athenians cannot expel domination from self-
governing politics while neo-Romans cannot show that legal rule protecting 
non-domination has its own public legitimacy. However, they prove to be 
complementary and give rich resources for our debate over the rule of law.
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１．Introduction
　Civic republicanism, rooted in ancient times in Europe, has lied under the 
history of political thought. It has experienced a lot of transitions adapting to 
each era and circumstance through a long history until today. Its 
implications amount massive and complex, therefore it is difficult to 
understand republicanism as a unique thought which integrates them all into 
a clear and strict doctrine. A number of alleged republicans has emerged in 
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many times and societies, but a simple line of republican tradition including 
all of them seems almost impossible to assume.
　Then it is no wonder that republicanism is taken as complicated and 
intertwined ‘strands’ and often divided into some strands in order to unravel 
them. Among such divisions of republicanism is one made from the 
viewpoint of origin or birth. Under this kind of division, republicanism is 
supposed to have two strands: one is rooted in ancient Greek, Athena in 
particular, while another is in ancient Rome, the Roman Republic. Though 
this type of division might have been made before, it becomes more clearly 
conscious and shared in some materials on republicanism in recent days. Its 
source seems to be found in Philip Pettit’s commentary on Michael Sandel’s 
book, Democracy’s Discontent, in 2998.
　Before that moment, the so-called revival of civic republicanism had 
emerged in the history of political thought since the 2950s through the 
works by Hans Baron or John Pocock. By their academic influence, it had 
been an almost common recognition that republicanism was rooted in 
ancient Athena, or at least was vaguely mixed with some thoughts in 
ancient Greek and Rome. It had been shared by other republican successors, 
for example, Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman in the republican theory 
of constitutionalism, or Charles Taylor and Sandel in the communitarian 
theory of politics.
　After the late 90s, however, new republicans such as Quentin Skinner or 
Pettit began to show that republican origin is actually ancient Rome, not 
Greek, and call a group of republicans in English Civil War, successors via 
Renaissance rooted in the Roman Republic as ‘neo-Roman’. It is within this 
context that Pettit’s commentary on Sandel, as mentioned above, was 
published. In this article, Pettit named a strand of republicanism assumed by 
Sandel, ‘neo-Athenian’, meaning that this term is distinct from that of neo-
Roman, for they have different views of liberty. Sandel himself didn’t deny 
this term in his reply to Pettit. After their communication, it seems, the 
difference between neo-Athenians and neo-Romans has been more clearly 
conscious by many theorists, and they have identified their own position to 
either strand of republicanism in this difference.
　However, these strands don’t seem to have much academic interaction 
thereafter, and few pieces of research which compare them in detail are 
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found.（2） This might be because each of them tends to set up its own 
position against its rival political theory, modern liberalism, and then has 
little interest in internal difference within republicanism. But it seems 
strange to me that republicans have little interest in their historical roots, 
though they often try to derive authority from their origins.
　This article, then, aims to compare these two strands of republicanism. Its 
main focus is on their conceptions of liberty and of the relationship between 
liberty and the rule of law. An abstract is mentioned above. In 2. I introduce 
the difference between neo-Athenians and neo-Romans in comparison to 
other divisions of republicanism. In 3. I explain their conceptions of liberty 
respectively. In 4. I consider how each strand derives a role of the rule of 
law from their conceptions of liberty. In 5. I raise some insights and defects 
in their views by shedding light on them from each perspective.
２．Two strands of republicanism
　The tradition of republican thought can be divided into two strands from 
the viewpoint of origin or birth. I call this kind of division as ‘genealogical.’ 
In the genealogical division, on the one hand, it is supposed to be born in 
ancient Athena, the Greek polis in which democracy first emerged and had 
been the most prosperous. And the classical authority, which has often been 
quoted and commonly affirmed in this strand, is Aristotle’s the Politics, and 
his famous formula ‘man is by nature ζ ον πολιτικόν or a political animal’ 
has inspired a number of these republicans. In this strand vita activa, not vita 
contemplativa, has been recommended as the intrinsic happiness or the 
supreme good for human life. In other words, the most valuable human life 
is neither seeking the divine revelation through religious faith, nor finding 
the objective truth through philosophical reflection, but taking part in 
political arena positively with civic virtue and deliberating the common good 
all together as citizens in a republic. The ideal life in this strand is in a free 
polis, observed in democratic polities like ancient Athena, where people 
governed themselves and were not dominated by despots or foreign forces. 
⑴　A rare exception is Honohan 2002. He argues comprehensively republican theories
and gives us the best introduction to them. And Richard Bellamy also deals with these
strands, though he points out that both of them are ‘mistaken’ in that they argue for
U.S. constitution in a legal sense. Bellamy 2008, pp.259-78.
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If we raise some of the modern representative scholars in this strand, they 
would be Hanna Arendt,（2） Pocock,（3） Adrian Oldfield,（4） Sandel,（5） Michelman,
（6）Sunstein,（7） Patchen Markel,（8） Jürgen Habermas.（9） I call this strand ‘neo-
Athenian’ after Pettit’s naming his rival strand.（20）
　On the other hand, republicanism is also supposed to have its origin in 
ancient Rome, the Roman Republic in particular. The classical authorities are 
Cicero or Sallust, civic humanists who revived their heritage in Renaissance, 
Niccolò Machiavelli who was supposed to be influenced by them, and James 
⑵　Arendt stated in The Human Condition that the term such as vita activa, or bios
politikos, derived from the polis life in Greek and Aristotle’s sense. Arendt 2958, p.23.
⑶　Pocock regards the civic humanist tradition in and after Renaissance as originated in
Aristotle, in particular his the Politics. Pocock 2975, p.67. “We are, in short, confronted
by the problems of interpreting a tradition of thought; but that tradition （which may
almost be termed the tradition of mixed government） is Aristotelian, and the Politics,
as well as forming the earliest and greatest full exposition of it, makes explicit so many
of the implications which it might at one time or another contain［...］”
⑷　“［...］if there is one place in western political thought where one might expect the
themes of citizenship and community to be considered together, then it is the civic-
republican tradition that has its beginnings in the ethical and political thought of
Aristotle.” Oldfield 2990, p.5.
⑸　He cited Aristotle’s the Politics and Arendt’s The Human Condition as examples of
‘strong’ republican view. Cf. Sandel 2996, p.355, n.2.
⑹　One might question that Michelman is really neo-Athenian. For he states with
Sunstein that among republican premises is the anthropological that participation is
‘public happiness’ in Arendt’s sense and the epistemological that ‘practical reason’ can
solve social issues, and declared that the right path ‘lies not through “public happiness,”
but rather through “practical reason”.’ Michelman2986, pp.22-24. But it is sure that he
understands the republican liberty as self-government with other neo-Athenians, except
he attributes this idea to Kant ― Kant, according to him, accepted the republican
conception of liberty through Rousseau ― not Aristotle.
⑺　Sunstein suggests that elements of deliberation, one of the republican creeds, have
been spread in American thoughts, which ‘can be found in Aristotle’ or Harrington.
⑻　Markell says that control is different from involvement and questions the usurpation
of involvement more than the control of domination. Markell 2008, pp.22, 32.
⑼　He is basically critical of republican theories, for he refers to his own position as
proceduralist that integrates both republicanism and liberalism, assuming that
republicanism has some theoretical flaws. However, even though critical of it, he
regards the republican conception of liberty as self-government, and at least takes a
republican attitude when discussing the relation between liberty and the rule of law.
Certainly, he quotes Michelman favorably. See Habermas 2996, pp.2485-86.
⑽　Pettit 2998, p.82. As mentioned, Sandel himself does not deny this label.
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Harrington in the English Civil War. In this strand, it is commonly 
recognized that the centralization of political power must always incur 
corruption and declination. Historical examples are too numerous to mention. 
Whoever or whichever branch seized the supreme power, increasingly 
abused it against others, and finally lapsed into ruin; whether a king or elites 
hold the power, the corruption was always an inevitable fate. Even people 
could not avoid the corruption after they held the sovereign power, as 
Polybius observed, for populist demagogues emerged or the majority 
oppressed the minority. It was never expected that corruption would be 
overcome by cultivating civic virtue on them: democracy or education was 
not a solution. Addressing this issue, Romans invented the republic 
constitution for the decentralization of political power. It was a mixed 
government composed of one, a few, and mass rule, as Consuls, Senatus, and 
Plebs in the Roman Republic, where these three branches were supposed to 
check the abuse of power each other lest one branch held the supreme 
power. If we raise some of the modern representatives in this strand, they 
would be Skinner,（22） Pettit,（22） Maurizio Viroli,（23） Jean-Fabien Spitz,（24） Frank 
Lovett.（25） I call this strand ‘neo-Roman’ after Skinner’s naming this strand.（26）
⑾　He first named Harrington and others ‘neo-Roman’, finding the Roman view of civic 
liberty in the Civil War during the middle of the 27th century. Skinner 2998, p.ix.
⑿　Pettit 2998, p.83. He is consent with Skinner to be in the neo-Roman strand.
⒀　He asserts that Machiavelli, which he regards as the source of republican thought, is 
a person attributed to the Roman tradition. “［W］e should study his［Machiavelli’s］ 
works as the highest point of the tradition of Roman scientia civilis.” Viroli 2998, p.4
⒁　He is considered to be in a position closer to neo-Roman, for he early introduced the 
idea of liberty as non-dependence and tried to put his interpretation of Rousseau in the 
strand. Cf. Spitz 2995, p.280, “La meilleure manière de comprendre en quoi consiste 
l'aspiration républicaine à la libertée est sans doute de partir de ce qui, aux yeux de 
cette forme de pensée, en constitue la négation, à savoir la servitude. La servitude est 
la condition de celui qui dépend de la volonté d'autrui, qui est exposé à ses caprices, qui 
est vulnérable aux fantaisies et à l'arbitraire de sa volonté,” pp.405-06, “Rousseau montre 
ainsi que le sort de la liberté est solidaire de celui des lois.”
⒂　A reservation may be necessary to add him in the neo-Roman strand, for his main 
concern is the analysis of domination, not republicanism itself. Cf. Lovett 2020, p.9. “［C］
ivic republicanism is, for me, a ladder to be thrown away once it has been climbed.” 
However, he can be regarded as one of neo-Romans, to the extent that the idea of 
domination itself is a neo-Roman theme.
⒃　Skinner 2998, pp.ix-x. He actually titles ‘neo-roman’ by lower-casing the initial letter of 
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　It is often controversial in the history of political thought to which strand 
republicans belong. The main focus of the conflict is on Machiavelli or James 
Madison. Whether they are neo-Athenian or neo-Roman is not an easy 
problem to solve and needs much effort to consider. But this kind of 
problem is irrelevant to my argument because it aims to consider how 
republican conceptions of liberty relate to the role of the rule of law. Then I 
don’t step in this matter and will leave enough room for later considerations 
on whether each republican belongs to neo-Athenian or neo-Roman. For the 
moment I only assume that there are two strands of republicanism.
Some comparisons with other divisions
　Republicanism is divided not just genealogically but also in other manners. 
Here I try to compare these divisions because they will make some 
presuppositions to the latter argument. It might be rather complicated or 
bothersome, so you readers, who don’t have much interest in such a trivial 
argument, may skip this sector to 3.
A difference from the division of intrinsic / instrumental republicanism
　First, the genealogical division is different from the well-known one 
between intrinsic / instrumental republicanism. The latter division is often 
made by contemporary liberals, like John Rawls and Will Kymlicka. This 
liberal division is set to judge republicanism from the viewpoint of value 
pluralism ― whether it is incompatible with modern pluralistic societies, in 
other words, whether it would assume civic virtue and political participation 
as the supreme good. If republicans intend that people should take part in a 
public arena and the government must cultivate civic dispositions on them, 
they are supposed to be on the intrinsic side because they admit the highest 
value of virtue and participation among others. In contrast, if they suppose 
that people should take part in political deliberation for the sake of maintaining 
the constitutional system of basic rights, they are on the instrumental side 
because they take participation as just means for liberal goals. The former 
is not, but the latter is, compatible with pluralistic societies where people 
have various views of a good life. This division, which proves to be made 
　‘Roman.’ In this article, I use upper-case R because a contrast of neo-Athena and neo- 
‘r’oman seems asymmetrical.
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from the viewpoint of pluralism, has been argued elsewhere.（27） In this 
article, I just focus on the difference between the liberal and genealogical 
division.
　At a glance, the liberal division might seem to be paralleled with the 
genealogical one. You might have an impression that intrinsic republicanism 
accords with neo-Athenian, while instrumental with neo-Roman. This 
impression is not unnatural because Rawls, who made this division famous, 
assigned Aristotle and Arendt to the former, and Machiavelli and Skinner to 
the latter.（28） And it might be enhanced because Sandel, who professes himself 
neo-Athenian, assumes the intrinsic position.（29） It might be contributory that 
Skinner and Pettit don’t tend to emphasize the conflict with liberals or 
theorists of negative liberty.
　However, we should not forget that the criterion of division between neo-
Athenians and neo-Romans is based on their origin or birth, and as the latter 
argument will show, there is a radical difference between their conceptions 
of liberty. At least theoretically, the reverse pairing is possible; neo-Athenians 
can take an instrumental position ― self-government is a mean for protecting 
the basic right ― while neo-Roman an intrinsic one ― non-domination itself 
is important for our good life.（20） However, the liberal division is now widely 
accepted even by republicans themselves, like Sandel or Pettit, and hence 
predicted to be better-known. I suggested that it would confine the theoretical 
⒄　Omori 2023, pp.8-26.
⒅　He distinguished classical republicanism from civic humanism. Rawls 2993, pp.205-06.
In the passages, he stated that his political liberalism is compatible with the latter
because it upholds the instrumental role of virtue for maintaining the constitutional
regime, but not compatible with the former because it sustains the intrinsic value of
virtue, the particular conception of a good life. His distinction has afterward been
accepted by many liberal scholars. See Omori 2023, pp.4-23.
⒆　Sandel declares in the controversy with Pettit that his position is intrinsic ― ‘strong’
in his word ― version of republicanism. “Of the two versions of republicanism ― the
modest version and the strong one ― the second seems to me the most persuasive.”
Sandel 2998, pp.325-26. See also Sandel 2996, p.26. “［T］he republican sees liberty as
internally connected to self-government and the civic virtues that sustain it. Republican
freedom requires a certain form of public life, which depends in turn on the cultivation
of civic virtue.”
⒇　Actually, Lovett’s position might be considered as the intrinsic version of neo-Roman,
while Michelman’s and Sunstein’s as the instrumental version of neo-Athenian.
岡　法（68―３・４）
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potentials of republicanism within liberal framework, but this is not a central 
issue for the moment.（22） In this article, I just say that this kind of parallel 
usage is misleading, so I take the genealogical division as different from the 
liberal one.
A subtle difference from the distinction of virtue / institution faction
　Second, the genealogical division has a delicate relation to the difference 
between virtue and institution faction. These two divisions can be said to be 
either homogeneous or not. The latter is the difference of approaches to how 
we can establish sound integrity of polity by making public and private 
goods compatible, in other words, how we can save the polity from 
corruption by protecting a government from individual ambitions. On the 
one hand, the virtue faction implies that the sound government would be 
possible only if all of the citizens have good dispositions. Even the most 
stubborn regime could not work without virtuous governors and citizens 
who would cooperate to maintain it. On the other hand, the institution 
faction underlines that the government could be established and protected 
from corruption on the firm structure. It could work well under the sound 
legal system without allegedly ‘virtuous’ governors nor citizens who would 
fall into descent someday. This division refers to the difference of measures 
with which people defend against corruption, so I call this ‘preventive.’（22）
　At first glance, the genealogical division seems to be parallel to this 
preventive distinction. That is, neo-Athenian strand looks homogeneous to 
virtue faction, and neo-Roman to institution faction. To be sure, already in 
ancient times, Aristotle assumed that citizens as the political animals had 
civic virtues, and Romans tried to set up the mixed government to prevent 
corruption after having abolished kinship. Also in recent days, neo-Athenian 
Sandel suggests that the formative project of civic virtue would be a 
㉑　I have already discussed this matter in Omori 2023, see pp.23-26.
㉒　This difference between virtue and institution faction is what Skinner finds in the 
development of political thought since the Renaissance. Skinner 2978, pp.44-45. Among 
this distinction, Thomas Simpson clearly stands on virtue faction. He denies Pettit’s 
‘institutions-only approach’ and states that “［t］he lesson for the republican tradition is 
that civic virtue is vindicated as necessary for liberty”, and the endorsement of virtue 
approach “is central to the republican tradition.” Simpson 2027, pp.52-52.
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prescription for democracy’s discontent,（23） and neo-Roman Pettit envisages 
various institutional settings for reducing domination.（24）
　However, I don’t think that the genealogical division is completely 
paralleled to the preventive distinction. At least each strand, neo-Athenian 
and neo-Roman, cannot be said to rely on either of virtue and institution. It 
seems that each strand has an interest in both approaches to protect and 
maintain liberty.
　One the one hand, neo-Athenians, not unconcerned with institutions, 
prefer them as a mechanism for achieving self-government. Sandel, for 
example, devises the formative project for cultivating civic virtue. In this 
argument, he takes some institutional conditions called ‘the Political 
Economy of Citizenship’ by evaluating the activities and proposing 
enforcement of Community Development Corporations, Sprawlbusters, the 
New Urbanism, Communities Organized for Public Service and so on.（25） 
Sunstein also draws some implications of classical republicanism and offers 
various proposals which expel the interest groups from politics and promote 
the deliberation in public space. He introduces the institutional implications 
of republican approach like Campaign Finance Regulation that can improve 
the market-centered selection, Federalism and Intermediate Organizations 
that can promote local-level deliberations, Statutory Construction that can 
urge discussions in law-making process and so on.（26） These practical and 
concrete proposals make us conscious of the fact that neo-Athenians have 
much interest in institutions, not just in civic virtue.
　On the other hand, neo-Romans, not indifferent to civic virtue, regard it as 
an indispensable premise to uphold the institution. Viroli, for example, states 
that republicans have constantly claimed for centuries that liberty could 
survive only by virtuous citizens. Even if there is a legal system, it will not 
work properly without patriotism and morality, for these can be said as the 
motivation to serve res publica or common goods, and the cooperative 
foundation that promises the proper operation of the legal system.（27） 
㉓　Sandel 2996, pp.324-28.
㉔　Petitt 2998, pp.229-240.
㉕　Sandel 2996, pp.322-49.
㉖　Sunstein 2988, pp.2576-89.
㉗　Viroli 2002, pp.22-23, 63, 69.
岡　法（68―３・４）
29
918
六二二
Skinner also points out that republicans have inherited the recognition that 
the civic virtue is indispensable for maintaining and guaranteeing freedom. 
Among others, “Machiavelli is restating, freedom is a form of service since 
devotion to public service is held to be a necessary condition of maintaining 
personal liberty.” Skinner also suggests that Machiavelli mentioned public 
sacrifice not for denying the pursuit of private interests but for maintaining 
the constitution which protects personal liberty because he “say［s］ that 
libertà, both personal and public, can only be maintained if the citizen-body 
as a whole displays the quality of virtù.”（28） In addition, Pettit, though he calls 
virtue as civility, offers a more detailed analysis on why it is necessary for 
the republican regime. It must widespread in order to enjoy non-domination 
because the law can be generally supported by social norms, people can 
actively take part in the contestable process, and the law can be 
implemented effectively by legal sanctions.（29） Without civic virtue, the legal 
system cannot assure freedom. In this way, neo-Romans also admit that civic 
virtue, in addition to the institutions, is essential for protecting liberty.
　As mentioned above, it is difficult to think that neo-Athenian and neo-
Roman strands of republicanism completely correspond to virtue and 
institution factions respectively. Both strands have the common recognition 
that both virtue and institution are necessary for preventing corruption. 
Certainly, it can be thought that two strands overlap to some extent with 
the two factions respectively. More precisely, these strands might differ on 
whether virtue or institution is the main goal; neo-Athenians, though not all 
of them, tend to regard civic virtue as the primary aim of republican politics 
while neo-Romans are more concerned with institutional arrangements. It is 
plausible that they are seen to be parallel. However, a reservation seems 
necessary in view that they are perfectly the same.
The neo-Athenian strand includes the CV / PV versions
　Third and last, the genealogical division is clearly different from the 
distinction between the cultivating-virtue （CV） and participating-deliberation 
（PD） version of republicanism. This distinction is not generally affirmed but 
㉘　Skinner 2002, pp.263, 222.
㉙　Pettit 2997, pp.242-52. See also Pettit 2998, pp.87-88.
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derives from my own argument. Once elsewhere I have set up this 
distinction in order to characterize the republican theory of law along with 
the PD, not the CV version.（30） But I didn’t intend to offer a comprehensive 
chart of republicanism which can classify republicans into this or that 
category. By this distinction, I tried to show the republican way to overcome 
the liberal separation of the public and the private and reunite them. The CV 
version is set up to bring the private persons up to public citizens by 
cultivating civic virtue on them in small communities like a church or 
township. This position may be distinct in civic education: direct conversion 
of personality. It is supposed to be assumed by communitarians, for example, 
Sandel. On the other hand, the PD version is designed to set courses which 
can deliver the private voices into the public institutions by multiplying 
channels of collective decision-making and enlarging forum of dialogue and 
communication. This position is supported by theorists of deliberative 
democracy: collective policy-making through dialogue and consensus. It is 
composed by reconstructing Michelman’s and Habermas’s arguments. This 
distinction is made in my argument for showing different ways in which 
republicans deal with the liberal separation of the public and the private, so 
I just call this distinction ‘expedient.’
　Then, what relation does the genealogical division have with this 
expedient distinction? Two versions of this distinction, though they differ on 
how to reunite the public and the private, are common in interpreting 
freedom as self-government, not as non-domination. As the later discussion 
will show, self-government is the neo-Athenian conception of liberty, while 
non-domination is the neo-Roman. In this sense, it is unquestionable that both 
the CV and PD version are neo-Athenian, not neo-Roman, which means that 
they are included in one strand of the genealogical division. However, if 
added in a hurry, it will be more precise to say that it is an internal 
distinction within the neo-Athenian subset, for not all neo-Athenians are 
classified into two versions in the expedient distinction. It just cuts across 
the subset of the neo-Athenian strand; there might be a case that some neo-
Athenians belong to neither version.（32） Too complicated and trivial. But note 
㉚　For readers who want to know the detail, see Omori2006 （though not written in 
English）.
㉛　Though it may make you more confused, I dare to add that while both the CV and 
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that this expedient distinction will be introduced and conduct the exploration 
in the later discussion.
　Enough discussion has been done over distinctions of republicanism. In 
sum, the genealogical division in this article is not the liberal division, does 
not parallel to the preventive distinction, and includes the expedient 
distinction in one strand. It is a distinction, unlike others, which focuses on 
the origin or birth of republicanism. But it has another important meaning. 
These two strands of republicanism, not just different in their roots, but are 
supposed to have distinctive conceptions of liberty.
３．Their conceptions of liberty
　In this section, I will show how two strands of republicanism interpret the 
concept of liberty. Either of them is regarded as a unique strand, 
particularly because it has its own distinct view of liberty. Both strands have 
tried to characterize their republican views of liberty in comparison to that 
of liberalism, but differ on how to define it.
The neo-Athenian conception of liberty: self-government
　Neo-Athenians consider republican liberty as self-government or self-rule. 
The idea of self-government traces back to democratic politics in ancient 
Greek and implies the direct rule by citizens. The famous Aristotelian 
formula might be regarded as expressing the features of self-ruling citizens. 
According to Pocock, Aristotle believed it as the supreme good that citizens 
on an equitable position actively participate in the political arena and decide 
what is the common good for them through discussion.
［T］ he highest conceivable form of human life was that of the citizen who 
ruled as head of his oikos or household, and ruled and was ruled as one of a 
community of equal heads making decisions which were binding on all.（32）
　PD versions are neo-Athenian, if we notice that neo-Athenian strand overlaps virtue 
faction in the preventive distinction, the CV version is more connected with neo-
Athenian to the extent which it emphasizes on virtue, but the PV version is less 
connected with neo-Athenian to the extent that it is close to institution faction. Please 
note that there is no assertion that the expedient distinction is a comprehensive 
classification of neo-Athenians.
㉜　Pocock 2975, p.68.
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　This Aristotelian view of liberty is said to have inspired neo-Athenians. 
They have believed that self-government is the supreme good, and at the 
same time, the essential activity for human beings. Self-government has the 
intrinsic value itself. This view is often contrasted with that of modern 
liberalism. Sandel, for example, states that the liberal view of liberty consists 
in an individual’s freedom to choose private matters of his or her own. In 
other words, each person is free to decide his or her own matters 
concerning a way of life such as clothes, hairstyles, partner or faith, etc. But 
he insists that the republican idea of liberty is different from the liberal one, 
and notes,
　Central to republican theory is the idea that liberty depends on sharing 
in self-government. This idea is not by itself inconsistent with liberal 
freedom. Participating in politics can be one among the ways in which 
people choose to pursue their ends. According to republican political 
theory, however, sharing in self-rule involves something more. It means 
deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to 
shape the destiny of the political community. But to deliberate well about 
the common good requires more than the capacity to choose one's ends 
and to respect others' rights to do the same. It requires a knowledge of 
public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, a 
moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake. To share in self-
rule therefore requires that citizens possess, or come to acquire, certain 
qualities of character, or civic virtues. But this means that republican 
politics cannot be neutral toward the values and ends its citizens espouse. 
The republican conception of freedom, unlike the liberal conception, 
requires a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the 
qualities of character self-government requires.（33）
　For neo-Athenians liberty does not mean what has been familiar to us 
since modern liberalism emerged and flourished, but lies in the tradition of 
classical republicanism that has already lost influence. The features of 
㉝　Sandel 2996, pp.5-6.
岡　法（68―３・４）
33
914
六一八
Sandel’s definition is that this view of liberty is linked to the idea of civic 
virtue.（34） Participating in politics or discussing common goods is an only 
burden for us, especially for those who are accustomed to the freedom of 
choice in private life. In order to invoke responsibilities in citizens, empathy 
or common sense must be cultivated in small communities, like associations, 
synagogues, schools, shopping streets, and townships that were seen in the 
past days. The idea of cultivating civic virtue through such communities can 
trace back to the republican tradition since Aristotle. For him, the cultivation 
of civic virtue is essential to dealing with democracy’s discontent.（35）
　However, some neo-Athenians, while they share the view of liberty as 
self-government by contrasting it with the liberal view, characterize it in a 
different way. Michelman, for example, suggests that liberty has been 
considered since Descartes in a negative sense, as being able to choose what 
an individual desires as long as there is no external compulsion. He calls the 
position that insists on this kind of idea as ‘decisionism,’ though he doesn’t 
seem to identify it to liberal tradition, by attributing it to our common sense 
since the modern times. Contrasting to this negative view of liberty, he calls 
the positive view as ‘self-government’ by consulting the Kantian philosophy. 
In this positive view, selecting as one desires, which means the obedience to 
one’s inclination, is regards not as freedom but as subjection. Michelman 
㉞　Sandel 2996, p.26 “［T］he republican sees liberty as internally connected to self-
government and the civic virtues that sustain it. Republican freedom requires a certain 
form of public life, which depends in turn on the cultivation of civic virtue. Some 
versions of republicanism construe the dependence of liberty on self-government more 
strongly than others. The strong version of the republican ideal, going back to Aristotle, 
sees civic virtue and political participation as intrinsic to liberty; given our nature as 
political beings, we are free only insofar as we exercise our capacity to deliberate about 
the common good, and participate in the public life of a free city or republic. More 
modest versions of the republican ideal see civic virtue and public service as 
instrumental to liberty; even the liberty to pursue our own ends depends on preserving 
the freedom of our political community, which depends in turn on the willingness to put 
the common good above our private interests.”
㉟　Sandel 2996, p.274. “Republican political theory teaches that to be free is to share in 
governing a political community that controls its own fate. Self-government in this sense 
requires political communities that control their destinies, and citizens who identify 
sufficiently with those communities to think and act with a view to the common good. 
Cultivating in citizens the virtue, independence, and shared understandings such civic 
engagement requires is a central aim of republican politics.”
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points that Kant worked well the internal tension of subjective and objective 
elements into a profound theory of freedom, and states,
　In Kantian terms we are free only insofar as we are self-governing, 
directing our actions in accordance with law-like reasons that we adopt for 
ourselves, as proper to ourselves, upon conscious, critical reflection on our 
identities （or natures） and social situations. Freedom thus is compounded 
of both a volitional and a cognitive element of both will and self-knowledge. 
One might well call this Kantian ideal freedom as integrity. The Kantian 
sense of freedom has deep roots in the republican tradition. Kant himself 
was directly linked to republicanism through Rousseau, whose work 
inspired him.（36）
　In his explanation, the idea of self-government is characteristically linked 
to the function of participation and deliberation. Michelman, by deriving the 
premise of self-government from Kant, approves the Kantian ideal of self-
legislation with the idea of citizenship. He states by citing Richard Bernstein 
that self-legislation is not made alone in oneself but ‘socially situated,’ which 
means that it must be made ‘by encounter with different outlook in public 
arena.’（37） That is the feature that distinguishes him from those who 
emphasize on the cultivation of civic virtue like Sandel （remember the 
difference between the CV and PV version in neo-Athenians, as discussed in 
2.）. This difference, though not discussed in this section yet, will influence 
how neo-Athenians understand the relationship between liberty and the rule 
of law, as the later discussion will show.
　Anyway, as we have seen so far, the neo-Athenian strand of republicanism, 
inherited Aristotelian philosophy, is supposed to be one union in that they 
share the view of liberty as self-government while contrasting it to the 
liberal view. However, it is not the only course of republican tradition. 
Another strand interprets the concept of liberty in a different way.
㊱　Michelman 2986, pp.25-26.
㊲　Michelman 2986, p.27.
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The neo-Roman conception of liberty: non-domination
　Neo-Romans consider republican liberty, in a way distinct from neo-
Athenians, as non-domination or absence of dependence. The idea of non-
domination can trace back to the Roman Republic, and its ancestors are 
regarded as Cicero, Sallust, and other historians. The Roman Republic, unlike 
Greek polis, was not governed in a democratic way by citizens. The Romans 
feared that democratic politics might fall into populism and majoritarian 
tyranny so that it would collapse the Roman regime itself. Likewise, the 
kingship and aristocracy also have the risk of falling into despot and 
oligarchies: Every single regime, through making a monopoly of political 
power, risks the corruption and depravity. Then it became their common 
recognition that the political regime must be composed of several branches, 
not one agency, so that any of them could not take control of all powers. 
They tried to protect the free polity by establishing the mixed government 
by one, the few, and the mass rulers so that each branch restrain and check 
each other not to monopolize political power. This commitment to the mixed 
government depends on their recognition that power always corrupts and 
their distrust in self-government by all citizens. Of course, it is also 
necessary to cultivate civic virtue for maintaining the regime, but if human 
beings cannot be kept fully virtuous, it would be the second best to prevent 
the corruption by the institutional system.
　In this way, for neo-Romans, the greatest enemy to freedom is domination 
and dependence. They maintain that an unfree person is under the arbitrary 
will of others and is exposed to their interference at whim at any time. 
Whether a king, nobles, or a majority of people, whoever holds power, will 
end as tyranny, so that he or she would control vulnerable people and 
interfere with them at whim. So it is the most important for protecting their 
freedom to avoid such domination.
　Great historical figures, whom Skinner describes as neo-Romans, like 
Machiavelli, Harrington, Marchamont Nedham, are supposed to have argued 
how inconveniently people depended on corrupt government in light of 
Sallust’s ideal of life in civitas libertas. They asserted, Skinner points out, that 
people would lose their freedom when they depend on the arbitrary power 
of their ruler even if he or she would not actually exercise the power. 
Skinner notes,
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　You will also be rendered unfree if you merely fall into a condition of 
political subjection or dependence, thereby leaving yourself open to the 
danger of being forcibly or coercively deprived by your government of 
your life, liberty or estates. This is to say that, if you live under any form 
of government that allows for the exercise of prerogative or discretionary 
powers outside the law, you will already be living as a slave. Your rulers 
may choose not to exercise these powers, or may exercise them only with 
the tenderest regard for your individual liberties. So you may in practice 
continue to enjoy the full range of your civil rights. The very fact, 
however, that your rulers possess such arbitrary powers means that the 
continued enjoyment of your civil liberty remains at all times dependent 
on their goodwill.（38）
　For neo-Romans, liberty means the absence of dependence, that is, a 
circumstance where people are not subject to the whim or mercy of their 
ruler as a slave is. And neo-Romans also explain this view of liberty as non-
dependence in comparison to the liberal view.（39） According to them, liberals 
don’t take liberty as non-dependence; people don’t lose their freedom simply 
by being subject to the arbitrary will of their master, because there is no 
real obstacle to their acts. Rather, people lose their freedom when they are 
actually subject to interference, for example, by suffering physical violence 
or intimidation by others. In contrast, for neo-Romans, interference itself 
doesn’t mean a lack of freedom; people don’t lose their freedom even when 
their ruler would restrain their bodies or deprive their income. Imprisonment 
or taxation is certainly a form of interference but doesn’t make them unfree 
by itself. What matters to freedom is that there is no ex-ante rule; if a 
government declares in advance that it will exercise the public power when 
people commit a violation or public goods are needed, imprisonment or 
taxation, certain forms of governmental interference, doesn’t infringe their 
freedom. People lose their freedom when their ruler would exercise the 
㊳　Skinner2998, pp.69-70. Cf. Skinner 2008, pp.84-94.
㊴　However, Skinner does not seem to make an emphasis on the contrast with the 
liberal view. He believes that “the fruits of Rawls’s hypothetical convention and of 
Machiavelli’s historical reflection turn out to be virtually the same.” Skinner 2002, 
pp.278-79.
岡　法（68―３・４）
37
910
六一四
power without any control of their will. Without any rule, a ruler would 
interfere with their free acts at whim whenever he or she likes to do.
　Pettit also distinguishes the neo-Roman view of liberty from the liberal 
one. He asserts that while the emphasis in the liberal tradition is placed on 
‘quantity’ of the conception of liberty, focus in republican tradition on 
‘quality’,（40）  and states that,
　The quantity-centred conception is a conception of liberty under which 
the antonym is any form of restraint or interference. If unfreedom 
consists in being restrained, then freedom involves not being restrained: it 
involves non-interference, pure and simple. The quality-centred conception 
of liberty, on the other hand, is a conception under which the antonym is 
slavery or subjection or, more generally, any condition in which a person 
is vulnerable to the will of another. If unfreedom consists in being vulnerable 
in this way, then freedom involves not being vulnerable: it involves secure 
non-interference.（42）
　This ‘secure noninterference’ mentioned above seems to mean a condition 
in which a person is guaranteed not to be ‘vulnerable to the will of another’ 
under a rule that restrains it: non-domination. It does not matter how much 
freedom is threatened, but how freedom is threatened. When a person is 
vulnerable to the arbitrary will of another, even if the former does not suffer 
actual interference by the latter at all, he or she would lose freedom. Liberty 
implies “emancipation from any such subordination, liberation from any such 
dependency.”（42）
　Neo-Romans often consider their conception of liberty as ‘the third way’, 
which is different from two conceptions that have been widely accepted so 
far. The concept of liberty has been usually interpreted as either of two 
different kinds. Isiah Berlin, for example, understood it in either positive or 
negative sense. In short, he suggested that the positive notion of liberty 
㊵　Pettit 2993, p.266.
㊶　Pettit 2993, pp.269-70.
㊷　Pettit 2997, p.5. Ibid., p.52. “One agent dominates another if and only if they have a 
certain power over that other, in particular a power of interference on an arbitrary 
basis.”
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means that a person wishes “to be his own master”, not to depend “on 
external forces of whatever kind”, while the negative notion means that I am 
not “prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do”.（43） Benjamin 
Constant also distinguished the view of liberty in a similar way; la liberté des 
anciens et celle des modernes.（44） Both Berlin and Constant prefer the latter 
to the former. Regardless of the pros and cons of both author’s conclusion, 
many theorists have contested over these two types of liberty along their 
terms. However, neo-Romans don’t believe that their conception of liberty 
falls under any of them.
　Viroli, for example, asserts “［i］t is easy to see that the republican conception 
of liberty is neither the negative nor the positive liberty described by Berlin 
and Constant.” On the one hand, it is not negative in the sense that a person 
is not “merely in interference （being obstructed by others, as Berlin puts 
it）.” One is supposed to be free to the extent that he or she is guaranteed 
not “in the constant possibility of interference due to the presence of 
arbitrary powers.” On the other hand, it is not positive, though he calls 
‘democratic,’ in the sense that a person has “power to establish norms for 
oneself and to obey no other norms than those given to oneself.” Rather, one 
is supposed to be free insofar as he or she is autonomous by being 
"protected from the constant danger of being subjected to constraint.”（45）
　Spitz also points out that Rousseau, whom he lists as a republican, is not 
caught up in Berlin's dualist view of liberty. On the one hand, according to 
him, Rousseau’s conception of liberty is surely negative in the sense that it 
is defined as not being dependent on other’s will. But it also implies that it is 
impossible to act as one wishes without the preliminary rule that everyone 
defines together, an expression of la volonté générale. On the other hand, 
Rousseau does not support the definition of freedom that Berlin regarded as 
positive, because, for him, self-government is merely a means for being 
released from the surveillance of every master. But self-government, which 
is a translation of la volonté générale, is also the means constitutive of 
liberty, for citizens cannot have any security necessary to develop their 
㊸　Berlin 2958, pp.269, 278.
㊹　Constant 2829.
㊺　Viroli 2002, pp.40-42［emphasis added by the author］.
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autonomous will without just and common rules.（46）
　However, neo-Romans often assert that though their conception of liberty 
does not fall under Berlin’s dualist view, it has unquestionably a negative 
sense. The concept of liberty has so far been interpreted by liberals like 
Berlin in the negative sense that there is no interference or obstruction on 
what one wishes to do. However, it can also be interpreted negatively in a 
different sense from the liberal one. Skinner, for example, suggests that neo-
Romans have consistently seen liberty as negative. “They have no quarrel”, 
according to him, “with the liberal tenet that, as Jeremy Bentham was later 
to formulate it, the concept of liberty 'is merely a negative one' in the sense 
that its presence is always marked by the absence of something, and 
specifically by the absence of some measure of restraint or constraint.” They 
just don’t agree with liberals “that force or the coercive threat of it 
constitute the only forms of constraint that interfere with individual liberty.” 
They admit that other forms, such as dependence on master’s will, can 
infringe on your freedom.（47）
　Pettit also agrees with Skinner that the conception of liberty as non-
domination is negative in a different sense from one that Berlin ascribed to 
it. According to Pettit, by Constant, Berlin, and even Pocock, republicans 
have long been regarded as preferring positive over negative liberty, “［b］ut 
this representation, I believe, is mistaken.” In viewing the concept of liberty 
negatively, two possibilities are open; to be free from interference may mean 
simply to lack interference, but also to be protected against interference. 
The former option is assigned to the liberal tradition while the latter to the 
republican. Therefore, “the main figures in that ［republican］ tradition also 
show themselves to be mainly concerned with negative liberty.”（48） The 
dualist view of liberty, which has been made up so far, is just misconceiving 
and misleading. The republican conception, non-domination, is “a third, radically 
㊻　Spitz 2995, p.445. “Mais la conception rousseauiste montre qu'il est impossible d'agir 
comme on le veut si l'on n'a pas au préalable défini avec d'autres la règle à l'intérieur de 
laquelle notre volonté peut se développer［...］ cet auto-gouvernement qui se traduit par 
le règne de la volonté générale est un moyen constitutif de la liberté puisque, sans 
règles communes et équitables, les citoyens ne disposent pas de la sûreté nécessaire pour 
un développement véritablement autonome de leur volonté.”
㊼　Skinner2998, pp82-4. See also, Skinner2990, p.300, Skinner2002, pp.220-22.
㊽　Petti 2993, pp.264-66.
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different way of understanding freedom.”（49）
　In sum, neo-Roman republicans, inheriting the ideas of Cicero and Sallust 
through Machiavelli, understand liberty as non-domination, the guaranteed 
absence from interference, in contrast to the liberal conception as non-
interference, a simple absence of obstruction. The neo-Roman conception is 
the third way, which does not fall under the dualist view of liberty, and an 
alternative to the liberal negative conception. For that, it is no wonder for 
them to lean toward the critical position against the idea of self-government, 
which Berlin defined as positive liberty.
Both strands conscious of the difference in their views of liberty
　The difference between neo-Athenian and neo-Roman view of liberty, 
which has been mentioned above, is recognized by themselves. Both of them 
are conscious of the fact that they disagree on how a person is free. In the 
conclusion, the neo-Athenian conception of liberty as self-government, as 
connected to civic virtue, is regarded as dangerous by neo-Romans, while the 
conception as non-domination, just negatively conceived, is seen as 
insufficient by neo-Athenians.
The neo-Roman view of self-government
　For neo-Romans, self-government, which neo-Athenians identify with the 
central feature of political liberty, is a misinterpretation of freedom and even 
the source of domination. Viroli, for example, asserts that it is a misunderstanding 
that republicans have regarded self-government as the highest political value 
among others. Republicanism has often been misconceived as one version of 
communitarianism, in which a self is supposed to be ethically identified with 
and embedded in a community. However, “［t］ his interpretation of 
republicanism as a form of political Aristotelianism is a historiographical 
error. Republican theorist believed that being a citizen meant not so much 
belonging to a self-governing ethno-cultural community.” Therefore, it is also 
misleading to say that republicans have thought participation in self-
government as the only, best way of life for citizens. For them, “it was not 
the main value or objective of the republic; it was a means to protect liberty 
㊾　Pettit 2997, pp.29-22.
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and to select the best-citizens for positions of responsibility. It is often more 
important to have good rulers than to have citizens participate in every 
decision.”（50） The republican view of freedom is completely different from the 
democratic view of it as self-government. My autonomous free will is 
protected when I am not vulnerable to the arbitrary will of others, “not 
when the laws or regulations that govern my actions correspond to my will.” 
Rather, self-governing politics itself would generate domination by imposing 
some member’s will on others through legislation. “A law accepted 
voluntarily by members of the most democratic assembly on earth may very 
well be an arbitrary law that permits some part of the society to constrain 
the will of other parts, thus depriving them of their autonomy.”（52）
　Pettit is also wary of self-government that might bring misunderstanding 
of freedom and harmful results. He is critical of neo-Athenians, particularly 
of Sandel. Pettit denounces him for that although he talks much about the 
significance of small communities such as school and church, he fails to find 
how to realize self-government in a complex and large society such as the 
United States today. And he doesn’t say enough about design of public 
regime, for example, what kind of institution can protect the republic against 
majoritarian tyranny. In addition, although he insists on the importance of 
civic virtue, he fails to explain concretely what kind of disposition it contains 
or how it supports the republic regime.（52） However, the main focus for Pettit 
is on Sandel’s view of republican liberty. Sandel regards it as internally and 
conceptually connected to self-government by attributing its root to ancient 
Greece and tracking the republican tradition from there. But Pettit puts “he 
is quite wrong.” What has been found in republicans in the long tradition, 
such as Machiavelli and Madison, “is a distinct neo-Roman republicanism, 
Ciceronian rather than Aristotelian in inspiration.” Therefore, the definition 
of political liberty as self-government is misleading in that it does not 
understand the history of republicanism properly. “Republican freedom is 
distinct”, of course, from the non-interference as liberals conceive, but at the 
same time, “from liberty as democratic participation.”（53） The neo-Roman 
㊿　Viroli 2002, pp.65-66.
　Viroli 2002. pp.42-42.
　Pettit 2998, p.82.
　Pettit 2998, pp.82-83.
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view of liberty as non-domination is the better and more sophisticated 
interpretation than Sandel’s, in that it gives us a proper explanation of the 
role of institutions protecting it and of civic virtue sustaining them.（54）
The neo-Athenian view of non-domination
　The neo-Roman view of liberty as a non-domination is, in turn, evaluated 
as insufficient and incomplete by neo-Athenians. Sandel, for example, 
criticizes neo-Romans like Pettit in that they disgrace the value of political 
participation and civic virtue as a result of viewing liberty as non-domination. 
According to him, republicanism is divided into two versions: one considers 
participation and virtue as its goals, another as only means for freedom. This 
division responds to the liberal one, as shown in 2., which distinguishes the 
strong or intrinsic version from moderate or instrumental one. Sandel explicitly 
confirms that he assumes the strong version by stating that this “seems to 
be the most persuasive.” He admits the inherent value of participation and 
virtue through tracing back to Aristotle and approves self-government of 
political community that influences our destiny. Pettit, in contrast, rejects the 
Aristotelian notion that they are essential for good lives of citizens in the 
political community and argues for the instrumental version whose goal is to 
secure negative liberty as non-domination. However, for Sandel, this is 
“unlikely to be stable” in that it makes them only means for the sake of 
maintaining a regime that enables the pursuit of private ends. If we view 
liberty as self-government, not non-domination, they must be ends themselves, 
not just means for other goals. “Unless citizens have reason to believe that 
sharing in self-government is intrinsically important, their willingness to 
sacrifice individual interests for the common good may be eroded by 
instrumental calculations about the costs and benefits of political 
participation.”（55） The negative view of liberty as non-domination, he implies, 
would impair a clue of solution that might otherwise be gained in the 
republican tradition, as the liberal view does, so that it might aggravate 
democracy’s discontent.
　On this point, such Pettit’s negative conception of democracy is criticized by John 
Maynor, who notes that “he unnecessarily limits certain positive features brought about 
by active democratic participation.” Maynor 2006, pp.225-38.
　Sandel 2998, pp.325.
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　In tune with Sandel, Markel also points out that the neo-Roman view of 
liberty as non-domination is insufficient and incomplete. He states that 
though Pettit appraises non-domination as an ideal, he “question［s］ Pettit’s 
claim that this ideal can serve as a supreme and overarching political value” 
because the notion of domination cannot explain a total map of what is at 
stake in imperialism.（56） The matter of imperialism is not only in that the 
empire would make people subject to the arbitrary will of the ruler, but also 
in that it usurps the right to take part in politics and decide by themselves 
what they do. In order to get back freedom from the empire, we have to give 
people opportunities for involvement, as well as control by putting the 
arbitrary will of the ruler under the law. However, Pettit, having made only 
non-domination effective for freedom, then comes to “have the unintended 
consequence of obscuring the significance of involvement and of usurpation.”（57） 
And Pettit suggests that imperium, the public domination in contrast with 
the private dominium, is problematic because the government puts people 
under the arbitrary will of the ruler, so to say, in the vertical relationship. 
However, for Markel, it is also problematic, if we look back to the case of 
Romans, because political power “was unduly concentrated; that is, because 
of the horizontal distribution of involvement it established among those who 
held imperium and those who did not.”（58） The case of master and slave, 
which is often invoked by Pettit, seems to have a different appearance if we 
observe it from the viewpoint of both control and usurpation; “Slaves are 
dominated to the extent that they are subject to a power of arbitrary 
interference by their masters; they are usurped to the extent that their 
involvement in this or that activity is interrupted or displaced. In many 
respects, slavery as a social form involved domination and usurpation 
simultaneously.”（59）
　The focus on the usurpation of involvement, Markel suggests, has 
significant implications for the idea of democracy. For Pettit, democracy is 
considered as a contestatory process, only a means to achieve the supreme 
goal of non-domination, while democratic participation is seen as a negatively 
　Markell 2008, p.22 ［emphasis added by the author］.
　Markell 2008, p.22.
　Markell 2008, p.25 ［italics added by the author］.
　Markell 2008, p.27.
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colored ‘populist’ act, which has given republicanism a bad name. By 
‘depoliticizing democracy’, he draws merits from democracy by protecting 
liberty as non-domination. However, for Markel, this “depoliticization might 
be at the same time useful for and dangerous to democratic politics: the very 
mechanisms by which we effectively avoid certain forms of domination （like 
majoritarian tyranny） may simultaneously have the effect of undermining 
citizen involvement in the everyday practice of governance.”（60） Pettit, for 
Markel, viewing participation in democratic politics as only means, fails to 
properly understand liberty as self-government.
　As mentioned above, both neo-Athenians and neo-Romans are mutually 
conscious of, and even hostile to, their rival view of liberty. On the one hand, 
neo-Romans criticize that liberty as self-government is misconceived and 
even dangerous source which might generate domination. On the other hand, 
neo-Athenians reproach the view of liberty as non-domination because it 
cannot explain the full meaning of democracy and provide a pathway for 
self-government. However, the more complex problem lies in the fact that 
the difference in their views of freedom influences their understanding of the 
relationship between liberty and the rule of law.
４．Their views of the relationship between liberty and the rule of law
　Republicanism is sometimes misunderstood in ways that it disregards and 
even is hostile to the idea of the rule of law. It might be because it has at 
times been introduced vaguely as a theory of democracy in the historical 
context of anti-monarchy. Or it might be because liberals, which appeared as 
opposed to republicans, have exclusively developed theories of the rule of 
law. However, republicans have often affirmed the significance of the rule of 
law and even believed it as an ideal since ancient times. The recognition that 
the rule of law is important for maintaining the political regime and ordering 
social world has been widely shared by republicans, whether neo-Athenian 
or neo-Roman.
　However, as shown so far, there is a difference between neo-Athenian and 
neo-Roman view of liberty. If the role of the rule of law is supposed to 
　Markell 2008, p.29 ［italics added by the author］.
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protect liberty, then there must be a difference about how to understand a 
relationship between them as well. In each strand, what relationship between 
liberty and the rule of law can be seen? This is the topic that I consider in 
this section.
The neo-Athenian understanding of the relationship: two subdivisions
　How do neo-Athenians regard a relationship between liberty and the rule 
of law? Remember here, as shown in 2., that there are two versions in neo-
Athenian republicanism; in the neo-Athenian strand, more exactly in its 
subset, cultivating-virtue and participating-deliberation versions are included. 
Repeatedly the CV version, assumed by Sandel and Oldfield, aims to bring 
up private persons to public citizens by developing their dispositions. By 
contrast, the PD version, sustained by Michelman and Habermas, seeks 
various channels to reflect private voices on public decisions by finding 
arenas of discussion in which ordinary citizens can take part. Both versions 
share an interest to overcome the liberal separation of the public and the 
private and to reunite them but diverge on how to do it. From the viewpoint 
of this article, both versions are considered to belong to neo-Athenian 
republicanism in their view of freedom as self-government, but they seem to 
differ in their views of the relationship between liberty and the rule of law. 
In conclusion, the relationship between self-government and the rule of law 
cannot be well depicted in the CV version but regarded as circular in the PD 
version. Let’s see below.
No view of the rule of law in CV version
　It is difficult to find some trace of the rule of law in the CV version. In the 
first place, it is said that CV theorists don’t have so much interest in an ideal 
vision of political society as in an ontological assumption on the self. In a 
communitarian position, it tends to refuse the liberal view of the self, often 
called ‘atomic’ self, but does not go further to design public institutions in 
political society. Rather, it is inclined to find some hope for politics in small 
communities as a kind of seedbed to cultivate civic virtue.
　Sandel, for example, proposes the formative project based on federalism. 
Federalism in its original sense is, neither a centralized state nor transnational 
government, based on a decentralized and local model. He finds hope for 
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self-government in dispersing sovereignty. Skeptical of global governance, he 
thinks it a right way to diffuse it ‘downward’; Tocqueville’s township or 
Jefferson’s ward system will be a helpful example. However, “［i］f local 
government and municipal institutions are no longer adequate arenas for 
republican citizenship, we must seek such public spaces as may be found 
amidst the institutions of civil society ― in schools and workplaces, churches 
and synagogues, trade unions and social movements.”（62） These small 
communities are important for self-government because they can offer their 
members local attachments, perspectives on common life, and habit of 
attending to public affairs.（62）
　In this way, CV theorists aim to educate citizens by cultivating virtue 
through small communities. However, in this course of argument, it is difficult 
to obtain suggestions on the role of the legal system in political society. Such 
an approach, which expects the ethno-cultural role of small communities, 
seems to tend to fall into the following difficulties ― what I call ‘trilemma of 
community politics.’
　First, autism: self-governing politics is completely self-sufficient within 
each small community. Such a small community, even though it is self-
governing, may be indifferent to other communities or wider society, so that 
it may not wish people from the outer world to join it. The Amish and 
Native Americans, for example, demand autonomy in education and 
territory but wish isolation from the secular society. Local attachment to a 
small community may make its members disdain the responsibility for a 
wide-ranging polity.（63） That means, as it were, the de-publicization of private 
concerns.
　Second, overflow: Self-governing politics extends from a small community 
to a wide-ranging polity. A small community, though it occupies only some 
part of political society, would be strongly united around its intrinsic 
common goods, so that it might suppress and eliminate other members who 
cannot share it. In some Muslim countries, for example, a small number of 
members, who has a monopoly of religious and political power, maintains a 
society in which other religions and sects are excluded. These societies, 
　Sandel 2996, p.348.
　Sandel 2996, p.324.
　Walzer 2998, p.276, Galston 2998, p.82.
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which have been condemned by liberals, may violate the principle of 
separation of church/state and individual freedom of religion. That means, in 
contrast to autism, the full-publicization of private concerns.
　Third and last, segregation: self-governing politics splits small communities 
and wide-ranging polity up to be coexistent and compatible. Each small 
community, although it does not wish to compel its doctrine over a wide-
ranging polity, might not commit to and interact with the polity. Recent 
theories which expect the role of various institutions in civil society seem to 
be inclined to such a conclusion. That means, on a midway between autism 
and overflow, the re-separation of private and public spheres.（64）
　The CV version, an approach to reunite the public and private by civic 
education through small communities, seems likely to fall into this trilemma 
of community politics. From the perspective of this article, it gives us little 
suggestions about how a legal system would emerge from self-governing 
politics, or what limits the former would impose on the latter. In sum, this 
version cannot properly explain the function of the rule of law in relation to 
self-governing politics. It is difficult to find some neo-Athenian perspective 
on the relationship between liberty and the rule of law.
The view of the relationship in the PD version: circular
　We can expect the PD version because it suggests, in contrast to the CV 
version, that liberty as self-government has a certain relation to the rule of 
law. Put briefly, it provides a model that political deliberation, through which 
liberty as self-government would be exerted, would generate law, which 
would, in turn, impose some restrictions on the deliberative process under 
legal framework. Here I will show, by introducing the view of PV theorists, 
that the relationship between self-government and the rule of law is 
considered as ‘circular’ in their arguments.
　Michelman, for example, in order to interpret the U.S. Constitution in 
republican light, points out Harrington’s influence on it. His famous phrase 
‘an empire of law and not of men’, Michelman states, already fixed in the U.S. 
Constitution. Harringtonian idea is that the essence of politics is ‘immediacy.’ 
　While I have ever pointed out ‘3. segregation’ as one of the flaws in the CV version, 
here I generalize it within defects of community politics. Those defects were not 
mentioned in Omori 2006, pp.229-58.
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Democratic politics means a process of self-government that brings ‘not the 
freedom of rulers as a class apart,’ ‘but the freedom of each person as ruling 
and being ruled.’ Of course, he thought like us today that it should not be 
distorted by passions or arbitrary will. However, what is supposed by him to 
stop an overflow of democratic politics is, not a law that goes beyond 
politics, but ‘a reason in the debate of a commonwealth.’ This phrase may 
give the impression of denying the rule of law, but actually not. Indeed, the 
reason in the debate of a commonwealth is the law for him. Thus political 
deliberation, while it is subject to legal restraints, would bring about legal 
results. “Deliberative political reason, it seems, must end by enunciating 
something ― law ― that ought to constrain the deliberation itself.”（65）
　In another article, Michelman finds the circular relationship between self-
government and law in Federalist’s arguments as well. Through reading 
their texts, he calls ‘jurisgenerative’ a political process that gives the character 
of the law binding upon all citizens as self-given. This jurisgenerative 
process of politics, a term of not his but Robert Cover’s, implies the circular 
relationship between politics and law. American constitutionalism, he 
asserts, depends on two assumptions over political freedom. The first means 
that people should determine for themselves the norms which will govern 
their social life, while the second means that people should enjoy legal 
protection against abuse of arbitrary power of government. In other words, 
the meaning of political freedom, on which U.S. Constitution assumes, 
includes both self-government and the rule of law. These two aspects are 
often the focus of discussion as contradictory, but after all it should be 
possible to think that they are “amounting to the same thing.” We must 
regard these two as an essential requirement of political freedom and seek 
to integrate them. It is necessary to think both a role of politics as 
successive law-making and a role of law as political-distortions-correcting. 
Thus “"law" in the "government of laws" formula must stand in a circular 
　Michelman 2986, pp.42-43. “It is the legal character that marks the output of the 
debate both as the product reason［...］.” And he also states in a note, “I can say at least 
（what must obvious） that republican legal rights are bound to be concerned with 
participation, capacitation, and emancipation. These themes are evident in various works 
of legal rights advocacy, and of rights-supporting normative theory, based on aims and 
assumptions that strike me as, broadly speaking, republican［...］.” Ibid., p.43 n.94.
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relation with politics as both outcome and input, both product and prior 
condition.”（66）
　This understanding is also sustained by Habermas.（67） He argues for a 
logical genesis of rights （logische Genese von Rechten） by contrasting it 
with the Kantian principle of law. This principle, he argues, upholds 
individual rights in the way that the liberty of each is compatible with equal 
liberty for all against the background of general law, what Kant called the 
Categorical Imperative. But this course of thinking leads to subordinate law 
to moral self-legislation, so that it cannot realize the idea of autonomy into 
the medium of law itself. Then what the idea of self-legislation by citizens 
requires that “those subject to law as its addressees can at the same time 
understand themselves as authors of law［...］ It is only participation in the 
practice of politically autonomous lawmaking that makes it possible for the 
addressees of law to have a correct understanding of the legal order as 
created by themselves.” Only if those who obey the law at the same time 
make the law by themselves, they could have confidence in the law as 
legitimate and be subject to the compulsion of the law. “The key idea is that 
the principle of democracy derives from the interpenetration of the discourse 
principle and the legal form.” Habermas calls this ‘logical genesis of rights.’ 
It is a process whose beginning is applying the discourse principle to the 
general right to liberties and which ends by institutionalizing a legal condition 
of political deliberation. And this process, at the same time, retroactively 
makes the general right to liberties, which was at first abstractly posited, 
into a more elaborated and concrete shape. He seems to mean here that in 
this process political deliberation and legal framework interactively affect 
each other, and they progress simultaneously in parallel. “The logical genesis 
of these rights comprises a circular process in which the legal code, or legal 
　Michelman 2988, pp.2499-2502.
　His stance is, as mentioned in the previous note, basically critical of republicanism, 
while he integrates it into his proceduralist theory. However, even though it is an 
object of criticism, he sees the republican freedom as self-government, and at least 
when he argues on the relation between liberty and the rule of law, republican colors 
appear. Certainly, he sometimes cites Michelman’s arguments favorably. Habermas 
2996, pp.2485-86. I have argued that Habermas’s theory of ‘logical genesis of rights’ could 
be more easily understood along with and supplemented by Michelman’s idea of 
‘jurisgenerative politics.’ Omori 2006, pp.259-232. Here I write on its summery.
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form, and the mechanism for producing legitimate law ― hence the democratic 
principle ― are co-originally constituted.”（68）
　Perhaps Michelman may not accept the theoretical premises of Habermas, 
such as the co-originality of public and private autonomy or the discourse 
principle. However, it is important to find that both shares the recognition 
that law and politics, whichever comes first, have a certain relationship: 
circular. They seem to agree on that law as a public framework imposes 
restraints on and guarantees a sound function of deliberative politics, in 
which participants can exercise the freedom of self-government, and in turn 
such a political process results in legal crystals and makes concrete the 
general system of rights to liberties, in ways that individuals can enjoy them. 
In their understandings, legal framework and deliberative politics are 
constantly influenced and are in a relationship that supports each other. 
Thus neo-Athenians understand the relationship between self-government 
and the rule of law as circular.
The neo-Roman view of the relationship: constitutive
　In contrast, neo-Romans consider the relationship between liberty and the 
rule of law as constitutive. They think that freedom as non-domination 
consists of legal protection that would restrict the arbitrary will of rulers; no 
freedom without law. They share the recognition that liberty is closely 
connected to and inseparable from the law in the thought of republicanism, 
historically or theoretically.
　Skinner, for example, points out this fact in the history of republican 
thought. He states that the Sallust’s argument that freedom does not depend 
on the arbitrary exercise of power and needs to submit it to the law, was 
inherited through Machiavelli, in the literatures authored by defenders of the 
Commonwealth in England, such as John Hall, Francis Osborne, Nedham, 
　Habermas 2992, S.253-55（pp.220-22） ［emphasis added by the author］. “［...］daß sich 
diejenigen, die als Adressaten dem Recht unterworfen sind, zugleich als Autoren des 
Rechts verstehen können ［…］ Nur die politisch autonome Rechtsetzung ermöglicht 
auch den Adressaten des Rechts ein richtiges Verständnis der Rechtsordung im 
ganzen ［...］ daß sich das Demokratieprinzip der Verschränkung von Diskursprinzip 
und Rechtsform verdankt ［...］ Die logische Genese dieser Rechte bindet einen 
Kreisprozeß, in dem sich der Kode des Rechts undder Mechanismus für die Erzeugung 
legitimen Rechts, also das Demokratieprizip, gleichursprünglich konstituieren.”
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Algernon Sidney, John Milton. They asserted, he notes, that
　It is said to follow that, if you wish to maintain your liberty, you must 
ensure that you live under a political system in which there is no element 
of discretionary power, and hence no possibility that your civil rights will 
be dependent on the goodwill of a ruler, a ruling group, or any other agent 
of the state. You must live, in other words, under a system in which the 
sole power of making laws remains with the people or their accredited 
representatives, and in which all individual members of the body politic ―
rulers and citizens alike ― remain equally subject to whatever laws they 
choose to impose upon themselves.（69）
　From the historical viewpoint, Viroli also indicates the fact that Harrington 
inherited the Machiavellian idea that freedom consists of law. Harrington, he 
notes, argued in his critics of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan that the rule of law 
is a necessary condition for citizens to live free and to prevent them from 
being subject to the arbitrary will of a few individuals. In his Leviathan, 
Hobbes claimed that the citizens of the republic Lucca had no more freedom 
than the subjects under the rule of the sultan in Constantinople because both 
of them were subject to the law. But Harrington asserted that the citizens 
of Lucca had more freedom than the subjects of Constantinople because 
although the latter was subject to the arbitrary will of the sultan who was 
above the law, the former was subject to the law, shared by both rulers and 
citizens, that aimed to protect the liberty of them all. Republicans “believed 
that the rule of law makes individuals free,” Viroli notes, “because the law is 
a universal and abstract command and as such protects individuals from the 
arbitrary will of others.”（70）
　This view of the relationship between liberty and law is often characterized 
by neo-Romans in comparison to the liberal view. Pettit, for example, states 
that liberal and republican tradition, though both are associated with a faith 
in the rule of law, have a different view of law and liberty. On the one hand, 
liberals, he insists, adopts ‘the quantity-centred notion of liberty,’ which 
　Skinner 2998, p. 74.
　Viroli 2002, pp.49-52. He adds that even liberals like John Locke had approved this 
view of the rule of law.
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means ‘to lack the interference of others in your life and affairs,’ and states 
on this notion that the law is not a protection of but an obstacle to freedom. 
The law violates the property right and the right to security of person by 
imposing a tax on property and imprisoning offenders; an increase in law 
means a decrease in freedom. Certainly, Berlin stated that political 
philosophers such as Hobbes and Bentham considered law as a constant 
‘fetter’ to freedom.（72） On this idea, you are supposed to be free when you 
encounter no interference of others in your life, even if you are not protected 
by the law. The law and public institutions are justified “to the extent that they 
leave people as near as they can hope to get, while living in society, to that 
ideal which they could perfectly enjoy only in the condition of the solitary 
individual.”（72） On the liberal idea, the law is just an obstacle to individual 
freedom, so that it cannot be analytically tied to the concept of liberty.
　On the other hand, republicans adopt ‘the quality-centred notion of liberty,’ 
which means ‘the status of being suitably protected against the sort of 
interference’ and state on this notion that the law is not an obstacle to but a 
constituent of freedom. The law, instead of violating freedom, protects each 
person from the arbitrary will of others. If the law does not prescribe any bans 
or sanctions, each person cannot be protected from the potential interference 
of others; without law, no freedom. On this notion, you are supposed to be 
free, not when you are isolated from others, but when you enjoy the 
freedom of the city, “the status of being fully enfranchised, fully incorporated 
within the body politic.” The law and public institutions are justified “by the 
extent to which they are so constituted that people flourish socially: they 
attain the status of full citizens.”（73） On the republican notion, the law is not 
extrinsic but internal to freedom. In Spitz’s words “outside of the rule of law, 
no liberty can exist absolutely.”（74） The law gives such a warranty that 
anyone would not dare to infringe other’s rights by violating the legal rule. 
　“‘A free man’, said Hobbes, ‘is he that ... is not hindered to do what he hath the will to 
do’.［...］ Law is always a fetter, even if it protects you from being bound in chains that 
are heavier than those of the law, say, some more repressive law or custom, or 
arbitrary despotism or chaos. Bentham says much the same.” Berlin 2958, p. 270, n.2.
　Pettit 2993, pp.280-82.
　Pettit 2993, pp.280-82. See also ibid., p.266-67.
　“［E］n dehors du règne de la loi, il ne peut exister absolument aucune liberté.” Spitz 
2995, p.288.
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It is only the rule of law that can guarantee the situation in which no 
intervention occurs. The law establishes a certain circumstance of security, 
within which everyone can enjoy freedom.（75） In the republican tradition, 
over the relationship between freedom and law, they have said, Pettit states, 
that
　The rule of law is inherently fitted, and not just fitted by the accident of 
circumstance, for the promotion of liberty. The rule of law is a crucial 
element in the standard way of bringing liberty into existence ［…］（76）
　In this way, neo-Romans tend to draw the insight from the republican 
tradition, in contrast to the liberal view, that the law is constitutive to 
freedom.（77） However, the historical fact that law and freedom have been 
considered as linked is not enough to demonstrate that they are analytically 
connected as neo-Romans regards.（78） If neo-Romans wish to show the 
conceptual link, it will be necessary to reflect more theoretically on the 
relationship between liberty and law from the notion of ‘domination’ or ‘non-
domination. This is another focus of their concerns.
　“［La loi］ ne sacrifie pas une part de la liberté pour conserver l'autre, puisque, sans 
elle, il ne peut exister aucune liberté garantie ; la loi est donc constitutive de la liberté 
entendue comme forme d'existence qualitativement définie par la protection de certains
 droits grâce à la loi.” Spitz 2995, p.292
　Pettit 2993, p.267. After this paper, Pettit raises ‘the empire of law’ as one of the 
conditions which republican regime needs to satisfy. Two aspects of that condition are 
2） that the law should conform to some constraints designed by modern theorists like Ron 
Fuller, and 2） that the government has a choice on a legal basis. Pettit 2997, pp.273-77.
　Skinner also points out that neo-Romans have seen the relationship between law and 
freedom in a liberal way. Skinner 2992, p.58. “For Machiavelli, by contrast, the law is in 
part justified because it ensures a degree of personal freedom which, in its absence, 
would altogether collapse.”
　It is somewhat dubious that liberals, as they insist, have actually seen law itself as an 
invasion to freedom. They often raise Hobbes in this context. Certainly, he has been 
usually considered as a natural right or social contract theorist, but very rarely as a 
liberal. Charles Larmore also points out that the Hobbesian theory of absolute sovereign 
has rarely been attributed to the tradition of liberal thought, and later liberal thinkers 
such as Bentham and Mill have developed a conception of freedom in a different way 
from Hobbes. Larmore 2000, p.229. “La théorie hobbésienne du souverain absolu ne 
ressemble guère à ce qu'on attendrait d'une philosophie libérale.”
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The relationship between liberty and law: more theoretical inquiry
　Let’s consider further how neo-Romans can think that liberty is 
analytically linked to the rule of law from the viewpoint of non-domination. 
Here Lovett’s theory serves as a useful reference which deals more 
theoretically with the idea of domination. It will help to explain the neo-
Roman view of the relationship between liberty and law.
　Lovett attempts to establish a conceptual link between non-domination 
and law. He insists that the rule of law is the most effective and reliable 
constraint to reduce and minimize the arbitrary use of power by others and 
protect freedom from domination. Generally, he states, four methods to 
coordinate social activities are available. The first method is the authority, 
designating one person among others and making him or her decide certain 
policies and resolve whatever conflicts occur. The second method is the 
deliberation, making equal participants gather and debate on common 
interests and subjecting them to their own consensus. The third method is 
the bargaining, settling property right initially and making market parties 
pay most to what they prefer so as to determine the outcome. The fourth 
and last method is the convention, setting out certain rules in advance and 
protecting expectations given by those rules. The rule of law is equivalent to 
the fourth method of convention and is regarded as one of the means to 
coordinate social activities. Not just the rule of law, other methods are 
incomplete and not all-purpose, so there is no general answer as to which 
method is the best. Each method can only prepare a better answer than the 
others for some problems and situations.（79）
　Lovett continues to examine which of the four methods is better for 
avoiding a situation that neo-Romans condemn as unfree, a situation in which 
one is vulnerable to the arbitrary will of others. First of all, the authority is 
utterly useless. Although he does not describe it in detail, we can imagine 
that authority itself may cause domination. Second, the deliberation is also 
inutile. As the outcome of the deliberation will be influenced by various 
twists, it will not give us any expectation that it will result in limiting the 
arbitrary will of the ruler. In other words, it cannot be ruled out in advance 
that a majority may accept an opinion that permits the ruler to interfere 
　Lovett 2026, pp.203-04.
岡　法（68―３・４）
55
892
五九六
forcibly with people. Third, the bargaining is not effective as well. Given 
some configuration of assets, a ruler may use large resources to purchase 
coercive services of people. Even if a ruler was not interested in them, he or 
she might change the mind and judge that paying for coercive services from 
people is worth the cost.（80）
　Therefore, no other options would be more effective and reliable than the 
fourth method of the convention, the rule of law, that can eliminate those 
cases in which the arbitrary will is exercised. Why? Because the other three 
methods leave the probability that the ruler would interfere with people. 
The probability cannot be ruled out to be close to 2 in the authority, for 
means of constraint on authority completely lack. It is always between 0 and 
2 in the deliberation and the bargaining. It can be only expected to be 
reduced in the  deliberation by incident agreement and in the bargaining by 
cost-benefit calculation. Neither method of them can change the situation 
itself in which people are exposed to the arbitrary will of the ruler. The rule 
of law is superior to these options because it can lead the probability to 0, at 
least normatively,（82） that is, it can eliminate the probability itself. Only the 
method of law can give an expectation and guarantee that the ruler can 
never interfere with people. “［T］he benefits of law［...］ involve broadening 
the robustness, so to speak, of that predictability. ［...］ The point is rather 
that the introduction of law significantly expands our freedom from 
domination by ensuring we will not be exposed to arbitrary coercive force.”（82）
　From this Lovett’s argument, it is possible to explain the general meaning 
of the neo-Roman view that liberty consists of the rule of law. For neo-Romans, 
liberty as non-domination is supposed to be guaranteed not with less 
probability of interference, but with the impossibility of interference.
　This point must be clearer if we contrast the neo-Roman view with the 
argument by ‘theorists of pure negative liberty.’ For them, liberty as non-
domination implies a situation in which the probability of interference is 
extremely low. Matthew Kramer, for example, explains this implication by 
　Lovett 2026, p.228.
　I give a provision ‘at least normatively’ because in an actual world, of course, 
violations of the law can occur even if they are banned by legal sanctions. In this case, 
we can condemn the actual violations as normatively illegal or wrong.
　Lovett 2026, p.227.
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giving an example of ‘Gentle Giant.’ The Gentle Giant, he defines, is far larger 
and much stronger than any of residents living near him and lives in some 
cave on the hill near their community. He could threaten and coerce them to 
be his slaves if he would wish, but he is gentle and mild enough to prefer to 
seclude himself in the cave so that ex hypothesi he is almost unlikely to 
exercise his enormous power.（83） For theorists of pure negative liberty, the 
residents living near him are free from his interference and cannot be said 
to be dominated. It is not because they are not under his arbitrary will, but 
just because they live in a situation, in which he is almost unlikely to 
interfere with their lives. If he interfered with their lives at all, though that 
cannot occur ex hypothesi, it could be said that he infringed their freedom. 
However, in this case, it would be better to say that they are exposed under 
his probable interference than to say that they are dominated by him. For 
theorists of pure negative liberty, the low probability of interference is not 
equivalent to the idea of unfreedom which republicans call as domination. “In 
short, in the very rare circumstances where relationships of domination 
genuinely involve extremely low probabilities of nontrivial encroachments on 
the freedom of subordinate people, we should not characterize the state of 
subordination as a state of unfreedom［...］ Pettit's republican inclination to 
equate domination and unfreedom does not illuminate such situations.”（84）
　Neo-Romans don’t think so.（85） Their emphasis is that the notion of 
domination is qualitative rather than quantitative. In other words, freedom 
from domination does not mean that the probability of interference is 
incidentally low, but that any intention to exercise the power of interference 
　Kramer 2008, p.47.
　Kramer 2008, p.49. See also Carter 2008, p.70. “While Pettit and Skinner insist that 
unfreedom is created by the mere possession of power （even in the absence of its 
exercise）, then, the pure negative theorist points out that, where A's mere opportunity 
to exercise power has some degree of probability of it would again be a very unrealistic 
theory of politics ［...］” and Carter 2999, p.244. “So it is simply implausible, even on 
Pettit's own characterization of unfreedom, to say that B suffers unfreedom at A's 
hands despite there being a zero probability of A's interfering with B and despite B 
being aware of this.”
　On this point, it seems more precise to say that the true contrast for neo-Romans is 
with this theory of negative liberty, rather than with liberalism. Neo-Roman republicans 
are contrasted to negative theorists, for they have divergence on views of the unfree 
situation.
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is restricted by legal rules. Returning to the Gentle Giant case, even though 
the probability that he interferes with residents’ lives is definitely close to 0, 
it cannot change the fact that they are vulnerable to his arbitrary will ― he 
could interfere with them whenever he wished ― and deprived of their 
freedom. What is at issue is not how likely he interferes, but whether he can 
interfere. Skinner notes,
　［E］ven if there is almost no probability that such slaves will be subjected 
to interference in the exercise of their powers, their fundamental condition 
of servitude remains wholly unaffected. It is the mere fact that their master 
or ruler has arbitrary powers to intervene that takes away their liberty, not 
any particular degree of probability that these powers will ever be exercised 
［...］ the situation in which slaves find themselves is that, while they may be 
stopped or penalized, they may be left entirely unconstrained.（86）
　Pettit also points out that alien control, a kind of domination, is not a 
matter of the probability of interference and states,
　［T］ he controller remains an agent, and an agent who is in a position to 
interfere or not interfere in an unchecked manner. Even if the probability 
of the controller's imposing a sanction is reduced, this will not remove the 
alien control exercised over the victims ［...］ A decrease in the probability 
of interference at the hands of an alien controller will not remove the 
specter of alien control［...］ alien control will remain in place so long as the 
agent can interfere or not interfere, whatever the reduced probabilities of 
interference that are dictated by the agent's nature. A decrease in the 
probability of interference will only provide a reason for consolation［...］ 
but it will not reduce the level of alien control and the associated 
unfreedom.（87）
　What makes the Gentle Giant abandon his intention to interfere with 
residents is the law. If legal restraints and sanctions do not ensure that he 
　Skinner 2008, pp.96-7.
　Pettit 2008, pp.223-4.
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would not interfere with them, they remain to be vulnerable to his arbitrary 
will, be anxious about being intervened at any times, and lose their free lives. 
Only by the rule of law, they can enjoy their freedom as non-domination. 
That is the meaning of ‘without law, no liberty’ for them. In this sense, neo-
Romans assert that liberty consists of law.
５．Some comparisons
　So far we have seen the different views of the relationship between 
liberty and the rule of law among neo-Athenian and neo-Roman republicans. 
In this section, I examine some findings and difficulties they provide in the 
light of each perspective. First, what kind of insight does each of them offer? 
Let's look at each view by comparing it with the liberal conception.
An insight in neo-Athenian view
　We can learn from the neo-Athenian view of the relationship as circular 
that freedom and law can be supposed to be mutually causal. In other words, 
it seems to give us a recognition that self-governing politics is regarded as a 
process to legitimate legal norms, and in turn legal framework is considered 
as a procedure to regulate the dynamic process of politics.
　In the liberal view, the relationship between law and politics seems to be 
defined as unilateral. That is, it is often emphasized that the basic rights to 
personal freedoms prescribed by law work as external constraints on the 
political process. In this assumption, democratic politics often tends to fall 
down into populism or majoritarian tyranny, and if some legislation resulted 
from politics violated the basic rights, it would be invalidated as unconstitutional 
by the court. Here legal framework protecting the constitutional rights is 
assumed to work as kind of ‘a cap’, which has a role to shut off the pressure 
of boiling political process; law tames politics. However, this sort of liberal 
argument, as I have shown elsewhere,（88） cannot show the democratic 
legitimacy of legal framework, which works as a constraint of politics. The 
public power will force the results of decisions to losers in the deliberative 
process of politics under legal prescriptions. But this cannot offer a course of 
　I have ever made clear that Rawls’s ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason 
lead to the conclusion that participation and deliberation are confined under the 
conception of justice and law. Omori 2006, pp.82-228.
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reasoning that legal framework, on which public power is exercised, can be 
accepted as legitimate by citizens. It is because though the law is supposed 
to constrain politics, it is not considered to be generated by and derived from 
the deliberative process of politics, in which citizens take part.
　In contrast, neo-Athenian republicans appreciate this reverse process. 
Certainly, as mentioned above, the CV version cannot explicate the role of 
law so that it would fall into the trilemma of community politics. However, 
the PD version can illuminate a side on which deliberative politics generates 
and legitimates legal norms. It can indicate the public legitimacy of law by 
showing the derivation and generative process of them. If legal framework 
is supposed to be a consequence of political deliberation by all participants, 
even losers in this process would be able to accept it as their own decision, 
whether they endure it or expect next chance. Neo-Athenians, particularly 
PV theorists, give us a recognition that the law constraints political process 
and at the same time deliberative politics legitimates legal framework.（89）
　This neo-Athenian view of mutually causal relationship should not be 
denied by liberals as well. It is because it admits with liberals that legal 
procedure should ensure that democratic politics would properly proceed as 
an implication of mutual causality. Neo-Athenian republicans have a common 
recognition that the rule of law is indispensable for basic rights to personal 
freedom. Their list would include civil, political, and social rights that liberals 
prefer to contain in the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of person, right to 
vote etc. Neo-Athenians also admit their significance and never deny their 
role as ‘a cap’ to close up boiling political process. Neo-Athenians, in addition 
to this assumption, attempt to show a foundation which legitimates legal 
framework that protects liberal rights. It seems that they aim to compliment 
an oversight that the rule of law is derived from self-government.
An insight in neo-Roman view
　We can also learn from the neo-Roman view of the relationship as 
constitutive that freedom and law can be supposed to be inextricably linked. 
In other words, it gives us a further recognition that freedom cannot be 
possible without legal rule, which ensures that both public and private power 
　If you wish to know the detail, please see Omori 2006, pp.277-232.
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should not be exercised arbitrarily.
　In the liberal view, more precisely in the theory of negative liberty, 
freedom is seen to have an only casual connection with the rule of law. 
Remember the Gentle Giant case. For he is defined as never or extremely 
less probably interfering with the residents, legal constraints and sanctions 
would not be needed. Even without law, they would be free to live, because 
they would not need to fear his interference. The law would be significant to 
the extent which he is defined as more probably or actually interfering with 
them. As long as they were unlikely free to live, the law would be 
indispensable for ensuring their free lives. He should be constrained not to 
exercise arbitrarily his power on them and if he interfered actually, he 
would be sanctioned by law. In this scenario the problem is that the need of 
the law for freedom depends on assumed cases and varies accordingly; when 
he is assumed to interfere unlikely, the law would not necessary, but when 
he is not, it would. In short, in the theory of negative liberty, freedom can 
exist independently of law, and if any interference is esteemed never to 
occur, the law would be seen even as unnecessary.（90）
　For neo-Roman republicans, in contrast, freedom cannot exist independently 
of law. Under their conception of freedom as non-domination, unlike liberal 
one as non-interference, people cannot enjoy freedom under the arbitrary 
will of others, even if actual interference does not occur. When they are 
vulnerable to other’s will, in a situation where others can interfere with their 
lives anytime at whim, they will behave not to hurt the other’s mood and act 
not against the other’s intentions. Only by their internal fear of potential 
interference, their freedom will be infringed. Therefore, in order to have 
freedom as non-domination, we must restrict the arbitrary will of others and 
ensure that interference can never occur. It is in this context that the rule 
of law is seen to be indispensable for freedom. Under legal constraints and 
sanctions, people do not need to fear any interference and to act conscious 
of the other’s will, so that they are free to live. It is irrelevant how likely 
others are to interfere with their lives. Even if the probability of other’s 
interference is extremely low, the need of the rule of law doesn’t change as 
　Pettit cynically points out that one would enjoy the maximum of freedom in a lonely 
universe without other inhabitants if liberals interpret freedom as lack of interference 
by others. Pettit 2993, p.280.
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ever.
　This neo-Roman view of inextricably linked relationship should not be 
denied by liberals or pure negative theorists as well. They also acknowledge 
that the rule of law is necessary to guarantee freedom from interference. 
They remain to admit that freedom is infringed only by interference. Then 
it might not be unnatural that by admitting that freedom can possibly be 
violated by the arbitrary use of other’s power, they would come to recognize 
that the rule of law is not only a necessary but an indispensable condition for 
freedom. Neo-Roman republicans give us this recognition, and attempt to 
direct a way toward the more elaborate model of the relationship between 
liberty and the rule of law.
　These seem to be important insights offered by both sides, neo-Athenians 
and neo-Romans. Next, let’s consider the problems that they raise. These will 
be made clearer when we compare their views from each perspective.
A problem in the neo-Athenian view
　We can point out that the neo-Athenian view of the relationship as circular, 
in the light of the neo-Roman view, cannot comprehend the inextricable link 
between self-government and the rule of law. Although neo-Athenians claim 
that self-governing politics should take place under legal framework, they 
cannot ensure that legal framework would always restrict all exercises of 
arbitrary power in every phase of deliberative politics, if the role of law is 
regarded as restricting only actual interferences. In sum, there remains a 
doubt as to how domination would be excluded from all the courses of self-
governing politics by legal rule.
　CV theorists do not seem to fully consider how the mechanism of virtue-
cultivation exclude domination. Sandel’s formative project, for example, 
depends on the role of small communities in civil society, so it is difficult to 
think that it can stop intruding and structuring of domination into their 
relations. It is conceivable that teachers in school, bosses in workplace, or 
pastors in church might force their power to make obedient pupils, employees, 
or followers on the pretext of instructing them. For CV theorists have little 
interest in the rule of law, they do not seem to introduce the mechanism to 
eliminate the structure of domination.
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　PD theorists, though they introduce the notion of the rule of law, also have 
the similar problem that they do not succeed in avoiding domination in all 
the courses of deliberative politics. Michelman’s jurisgenerative politics, for 
example, shares with Sandel an appreciation that communities in civil society 
should be central to politics. Then both of them cannot deny a fact that 
there must be a room for the subordination and servitude to enter into 
political deliberation in those communities. This kind of difficulty arises 
generally from the attitude of appraising uncritically the role of communities 
in civil society. As Micheman notes,
　Much, perhaps most, of that experience must occur in various arenas of 
what we know as public life in the broad sense, some nominally political and 
some not: in the encounters and conflicts, interactions and debates that arise 
in and around town meetings and local government agencies; civic and 
voluntary organizations; social and recreational clubs; schools public and 
private; managements, directorates and leadership groups of organizations of 
all kinds; workplaces and shop floors; public events and street life; and so on. 
Those are all arenas of potentially transformative dialogue［...］ Those 
encounters and transactions are, then, to be counted among the sources and 
channels of republican self-government and jurisgenerative politics.（92）
　However, it cannot be denied that there include some subordinate 
relationships in ‘these encounters and transactions’ in civil society. In fact, 
Michelman, who is critical of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bower v. 
Hardwick, attempts to admit for lesbian and gay couples the legal protection 
of privacy as a political opportunity to develop citizenship. But such homosexual 
couples, as well as any other relationship, are always accompanied by risks 
of sexual harassment or domestic violence against the partner. Probably PV 
theorists would claim that for political deliberation is involved in the circular 
relationship with legal framework, these types of relationship should be 
subject to the legal restriction. But if this restrictive role of law is confined 
to preventing incidental interference, they cannot introduce a mechanism to 
eliminate subordination from all the phases of political deliberation into their 
　Michelman 2988, p.2532.
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theoretical model. They might have to endorse that domination is also the 
enemy of freedom and to invent a new model which includes a mechanism 
penetrating the rule of law with every phase of political deliberation.（92）
A problem in the neo-Roman view
　We can also point out that the neo-Roman view of the relationship as 
constitutive, in the light of the neo-Athenian view, cannot comprehend the 
mutual causality between non-domination and the rule of law. Although neo-
Romans assert that legal rule must exclude any species of subordination 
among people and protect freedom from the arbitrary will of others, they 
cannot show the democratic derivation of such a restrictive rule. We wonder 
how the law ruling out domination can be voluntarily accepted by citizens as 
properly exercising public power. In short, it is questionable whether neo-
Romans intend to show the public legitimacy of legal framework in their 
view.
　Certainly, neo-Romans tend to be somewhat cynical about self-government 
and democracy. They do not place much weight on political participation or 
deliberation, so are negative to the view that legal norms are the products 
of agreements through the deliberative process. They seem to fear that 
political discussion itself might be an opportunity for someone to exercise 
arbitrary power. Viroli, for example, does not trust democratic legislation 
and states,
　Action regulated by law is free, in other words, not when the law is 
accepted voluntarily, or when it corresponds to the desires of the citizens, 
but when the law is not arbitrary that is when it respects universal 
norms （when it applies to all individuals or to all members of the group in 
question）, aspires to the public good, and for this reason protects the will 
of the citizens from the constant danger of constraint imposed by individuals 
and therefore renders the will fully autonomous. A law accepted voluntarily 
by members of the most democratic assembly on earth may very well be 
an arbitrary law that permits some part of the society to constrain the will 
　On this point, I might have to modify the theoretical model of law and politics I have 
ever described in Omori 2006, if I would introduce the neo-Roman view into it.
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of other parts, thus depriving them of their autonomy.（93）
　In the paragraph above, Viroli looks afraid of a risk that the legislative 
branch, which is composed by representatives of citizens, might be forced to 
exercise their arbitrary power to enact the law, rather than to enact valid 
and legitimate law as a result of democratic deliberation. Pettit is also afraid 
of direct democracy. He regards democracy as contestation rather than a 
process by which people directly gather and discuss to make decisions by 
their agreement. In his view, democracy is not set up to be a decision- 
making process itself, but a process approving or complaining political 
decisions. Note that these decisions have already been made prior to the 
contestation process. His view of democracy as contestation assumes that 
the objects of protestation have given and been decided beyond political 
deliberation. Thus he states that it is certainly necessary to include a variety 
of voices in the legislative assembly, but “［w］hat is even more important, 
especially with the administration and judiciary, is that there is room for you 
and those of the relevant kind to protest to the representative bodies in 
question, in the event of your believing that things have not been properly 
done.”（94） Of course, such a contestation might also be included in a part of 
the deliberative process in a broad sense. However, can we expect citizens 
to accept the compulsory power of law as legitimate although they were 
foreclosed in the decision-making process of deliberation ex ante and 
involved only in an opportunity of contestation ex post?（95） Neo-Romans might 
have to affirm that self-government is also a part of freedom and to find a 
measure which ensures that the law ruling out domination would be 
accepted as legitimate by citizens who took part in enacting it.（96）
　Viroli 2002, p.43.
　Pettit 2997, p293.
　Since neo-Romans have traditionally approved the mixed government, they tend to 
think that democracy, the rule of majority, is only one branch in the total regime, which 
should be restrained by other branches. For democracy potentially falls down into 
majoritarian tyranny, they emphasize freedom from domination rather than self-
government.
　Markell gives us a clue by asserting that self-governing participation is both a goal 
and mean in the sense that on the one hand it is preserved for its own sake, but on the 
岡　法（68―３・４）
65
882
五八六
６．Interim conclusion
　From the argument so far, both neo-Athenian and neo-Roman views of the 
relationship between liberty and rule of law prove to have difficulties as well. 
However, they can also be regarded as complementary, not confrontational, 
if we see that they throw positive challenges to each other. The mutual 
complement is possible only by introducing each insight into their respective 
defects. On the one hand, it is necessary to redefine political deliberation, in 
which citizens exercise freedom as self-government, in a way that any arbitrary 
exercise of power would be ruled out in all the phases by legal rule. On the 
other hand, it is also essential to reconsider legal framework, which ensures 
freedom as non-domination, in a way that it would be accepted by citizens as 
legitimate, their own products of political deliberation.
　I have tried to construct a theoretical model of law and politics along with 
the PV version of neo-Athenian republicanism. From the conclusion of this 
article, I feel that the model must be amended by endorsing the neo-Roman 
view of freedom as non-domination and introducing the restrictive role of law 
which excludes any subordination. However, this is a task not of this paper, 
but in the future.
　In any case, two strands of republicanism will enrich the conventional 
conception of the rule of law by adding new views of liberty. Until now, the 
arguments around the rule of law seem to have been monopolized by liberal 
constitutionalists and raised up within its framework. However, republicans 
have also traditionally built up the notions about the rule of law, together 
with the idea of liberty, which include rich resources liberals can also learn 
from. The republican views of liberty, both neo-Athenian and neo-Roman, 
will increase a range and depth of discussion over the rule of law.
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